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Abstract. The advances in positioning technologies and the emergence of geolocation standards
opens up to the development of innovative location-based services (LBS), e.g., web-based LBS. These
services challenge existing privacy protection solutions. For example, the position information is pro-
vided by a third party, the location provider, and this party may be not fully trusted. In this paper,
we analyze the web-based LBS model. Then we outline the privacy-aware geolocation strategy which
minimizes the interaction with the untrusted location provider by caching the information that is
useful to determine the position in proximity of the private positions, e.g., home, which have been
already visited. The deployment of this strategy requires investigating several issues and novel tools.
The objective of this paper is to discuss the technical challenges and suggest directions of research
towards a comprehensive privacy-preserving framework. To our knowledge, this is the first work on
privacy protection against untrusted location providers.
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1 Introduction
Location-based services (LBS) are gaining increasing attention due to their potential of pro-
viding highly-personalized services. Typical services allow to search for points of inter-
est in the vicinity (i.e., which is the closest petrol station) and share the position with the
members of a social network (i.e., where are my friends). The conventional client-server
architecture of an LBS is illustrated in Figure 1: the user requests the service through the
interface of an application running on a mobile device (client); the client transfers the po-
sition, acquired for example through the GPS or some other trusted location source, to the
LBS providerwhich uses such information to customize the service.
The protection of the position information (location privacy) is a major issue in LBSs [22].
This concern is due to the fact that LBS providers may not have the ability or interest to
protect the position information conveyed by the requesters of the service, while position
is a kind of personal information that, as such, requires special care. For example, LBS
providers can use position data for purposes other than providing the service, i.e., adver-
tising; or even though there is no malicious intent, data can be stolen or accessed improp-
erly by unauthorized subjects. Because of this, LBS providers are generally considered
untrusted.
The lack of user’s trust hinders the diffusion of LBSs. For example, according to a recent
market research, more than half of consumers in UK are not comfortable with businesses
using location-based technology, even if that would improve the customer service [7].
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Figure 1: Conventional LBS model: the LBS provider is untrusted while the location source
is trusted
In several countries, the collection and use of personal information, including position,
is regulated by privacy norms. Privacy norms state that personal information can only
be collected respecting a set of principles which can be summarized as: transparency, le-
gitimate purpose and proportionality1. Regulations, however, cannot protect position data
against malicious parties which deliberately try to violate privacy. That is instead the goal
of privacy-enhancing technologies (PET).
In recent years, a broad range of PETs have been developed to protect location information
against untrusted providers. LBSs are now rapidly evolving under the pressure of various
factors such as advances in positioning systems and business models [22, 11], while new
privacy requirements are emerging which challenge existing PETs. In this paper we focus
on privacy issues raised by a novel class of services that we term web-based LBS. Web-
based LBS are services which can be accessed through a geo-enabled web browser (i.e.,
web browser that can locate the hosting device). Examples of web-based LBSs are Google
Latitude2 and Foursquare3. Because these services are representative of the next generation
LBSs we believe that this discussion is of general interest.
Figure 2: Web-based LBS model: the location source is a third party location provider
1Transparency means that “an individual or consumer has the right to be informed when their personal data
is being processed; and, has the right to access all data processed about him”. Legitimate purpose means that
“personal data can only be processed for specified explicit and legitimate purposes and may not be processed
further in a way incompatible with those purposes”. Proportionality means that “personal data may be processed
only insofar as it is adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected
and/or further processed” [33]
2http://www.google.com/intl/en us/latitude/intro.html
3https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/tag/foursquare
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1.1 The web-based LBS model
Figure 2 shows the reference architecture of a web-based LBS. The service is accessed
through a website which has the capability of locating the client. We refer to the website as
LBS provider.
This architecture presents a major novelty with respect to the conventional LBS model,
namely the position is computed by a third party, the location provider. Examples of loca-
tion providers are Google Location Service4 and Skyhook Wireless5. Location providers
use hybrid positioning (or geolocation) systems to provide high quality geolocation ser-
vices, i.e., accurate and pervasive geolocation, across heterogeneous environments such as
indoor/outdoor, and urban/rural settings.
These systems estimate the position based on context information sent by the client (con-
text in the figure), e.g., the wifi infrastructure in the vicinity. Notably, the geolocation ser-
vice is offered on a free basis provided that the user agrees to disclose his/her position.
The information flow is as follows: the user requesting the LBS is asked to give consent
for his/her position to be monitored. In case of affirmative consent, the client requests
its own position to the location provider. Based on the contextual information, the loca-
tion provider estimates the position and returns the geographical coordinates, at the finest
granularity obtainable, together with the estimated accuracy of the position. The position
can then be forwarded to the LBS provider.
1.2 Privacy-aware geolocation
In this scenario, users may not trust location providers for the same reasons they may not
trust LBS providers. Even though location providers comply with privacy regulations, it is
clear that collected location data are exposed to a variety of risks, such as fraudulent access.
Therefore, if high quality geolocation services are provided by third parties, and those
parties are not fully trusted, the high quality of position is paid in terms of privacy loss.
The core question is how to balance these conflicting requirements, i.e., if and how users
can benefit from high quality geolocation services without disclosing their detailed where-
abouts to third party location providers.
Ensuring the protection of the position against location providers is an intriguing issue
because it means to protect the position against the party which computes such position.
A definitive solution would be to run the geolocation system on the client. This is also the
solution of Intel’s Place Lab [26], the system precursor of the commercial hybrid positioning
systems. The drawback of this solution is that it is not appropriate for the business model
under consideration because it is unlikely that geolocation systems comparable in terms of
quality of service to those used by third parties can be provided to users for free.
We present a different viewpoint. We advocate that the amount of information that the
user conveys to the location provider exceeds what is really necessary to determine the
user’s position. Accordingly, a more appropariate approach is to minimize the interaction
with the location provider. One approach is to record locally selected positions that have
already been visited and associate each of those positions with an environmental finger-
print, i.e., a signature based on the value of environmental variables. That way, the client
can recognize known positions and interact with the location provider only in those cases
in which the current position cannot be found locally. We refer to this form of geolocation
4http://www.google.com/intl/zh-CN/events/facultysummit/2010/files/mobile location.pdf
5http://www.skyhookwireless.com/
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as privacy-aware geolocation. This strategy has the potential of balancing the interests of the
third party with the privacy demands of users. A nice feature of privacy-aware geolocation
is that it is in line with the data protection principle of proportionality.
1.3 Contributions and paper organization
The contribution of this paper is twofold:
• We analyze the components of the web-based LBS architecture. We consider in some
detail wifi-based positioning (WPS) because it is becoming increasingly pervasive.
Moreover, it can represent one of the enabling factors of privacy-aware geolocation.
This first contribution provides the background knowledge and the motivation of the
work.
• We outline the features of a comprehensive architectural and modeling framework
providing the privacy-aware geolocation service. We define the key components of
the framework, and for each of them we describe research issues, the current state-
of-the-art, and propose directions of research.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 overviews main lines of research on privacy
protection in on-line applications. Section 3 presents the key features of the web-based LBS
architecture. In Section 4 we introduce the proposed privacy-preserving framework. The
discussion on the research issues is presented in Section 5. The final section reports future
plans and some conclusions.
2 Related work
There has been considerable work in defining methods for the safeguard of privacy in on-
line applications. Closest related work is about the specification of privacy policies and
related standards, and the development of PETs, respectively. These two paradigms are
complementary in that privacy policies emphasize the importance of privacy personaliza-
tion while PETs emphasize the effectiveness of privacy protection. Both aspects are rele-
vant for the design of a comprehensive privacy-preserving framework. This section briefly
overviews the main lines of research within each of these streams.
Policy-based approaches. A privacy policy specifies the privacy practices of an organi-
zation, basically what kind of personal information is collected, the purpose and how the
information will be used. Privacy policies are defined in compliance with the existing pri-
vacy regulations. In simplest form, privacy policies are encoded in natural language and
are directly enforced by users. Manual enforcement is however expensive and thus policies
are often ignored by users. This problem is particularly relevant when users visit websites.
Automating privacy policy enforcement has been the main objective of early research on
privacy protection on the web. The most popular privacy framework is P3P [8] which al-
lows websites to publish their policies in XML. While the platform has become a standard
supported by major browsers, P3P is not greatly used in practice. A major criticism of P3P
is the poor usability of the platform [28].
A different approach, focused on the protection of location information is IETF Geopriv.
Specifically, Geopriv is a standard for the transmission of location information over the
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Internet [3]. In this case, the policy is specified by the user and not by the organization.
Geopriv has not found yet a broad consensus.
Further approaches investigate the usability of formal policy specification languages. For
example, the study conducted in [32] analyzes the feedback provided by the users of a
mobile location sharing application using solely time-based privacy rules such as: Show my
location between 9 am and 6 pm on Mondays and Wednesdays.
In summary, privacy policies are flexible and support the personalization of privacy pref-
erences. However, privacy polices only provide a deterrent against privacy violations.
Therefore, if a third party decides to violate those norms, in spite of the risk of penalties,
the user’s position cannot be protected.
Privacy-enhancing techniques. Since the pioneering work of Gruteser et al. [16] and
Beresford et al. [4], a large number of solutions have been developed to prevent undesir-
able inferences that can defeat privacy protection in LBS. In parallel, different taxonomies
have been proposed which classify protection techniques [20, 5, 14, 25]. One of the funda-
mental classification criteria used across the various taxonomies emphasizes the distinction
between techniques which target identity privacy as opposed to location privacy [20].
Identity privacy refers to the protection of the user’s anonymity against inferences which
relate the user’s position to his/her identity. The most popular paradigm for the protection
of identity privacy in LBS is location k-anonymity [16], which translates into the spatial do-
main the paradigm of k-anonymity originally developed in the context of relational data
publishing [31]. The key idea of location k-anonymity is to degrade the quality of the user’s
position to generate coarse regions which contain at least k individuals (k-anonymous re-
gions). This way the position cannot be univocally associated with an individual. Methods
relying on location k-anonymity, such as [6] assume the existence of a trusted third party,
which generates the k-anonymous regions based on the knowledge of all of the users’ po-
sition.
The second stream of research on location privacy focuses on protection of the user’s po-
sition, where the position itself represents a type of personal information. As such, position
must be protected. Popular methods include techniques which degrade the quality of the
position information (cloaking methods) such as [13], and techniques based on cryptographic
transformations, such as [15]. In all of these approaches, the semantic dimension of posi-
tions, i.e., what the position represents for the user, say a hospital or a point along a street, is
ignored. A different viewpoint is presented by PROBE [9, 10]. PROBE introduces two novel
ideas: i) the user can easily express privacy preferences by selecting the semantic locations
to protect from a pre-defined list of categories, e.g. hospital, religious buildings, along with
the degree of privacy; ii) the cloaking methods generate coarse regions which cover the
spatial extent of sensitive locations independently from the user’s position. Thus, at run-
time if the user’s position falls inside one of these regions, that region is returned in place
of the exact position. Amajor limitation of the approach is that the location sources must be
trusted. Note that this assumption is common to all the PETs developed for the protection
of privacy in LBS. Accordingly PROBE as well as the other solutions cannot be used within
the framework of a web-based LBS, whenever location providers are untrusted.
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3 The web-based LBS architecture
This section examines relevant features of the web-based LBS architecture and in particular
the role of the location provider and how the geolocation functionalities can be requested
through geo-enabled browsers. The theme of this analysis is twofold: to demonstrate
the need for PETs protecting against untrusted location providers; to provide background
knowledge on wifi-based positioning to facilitate the reading of the next sections.
3.1 The location provider
The location providers provide geolocation services. In order to serve clients which can
be variously equipped and which can be located in different settings, i.e., urban vs. rural
settings, location providers use different types of techniques, integrated in the so-called
hybrid positioning systems. These systems encompass one or more cell-based position-
ing technologies, for example WPS. WPS offers exciting opportunities because the position
can be determined both indoors and outdoors, with an accuracy 6 that is sufficient for most
LBS.Moreover, WPS does not require a dedicated infrastructure, is cheap, and is commonly
available on a variety of devices, e.g., smartphones, laptops. For these reasons wifi geolo-
cation can be also relevant for the deployment of the privacy-aware geolocation service.
3.1.1 Wifi-based positioning system
The wireless LAN (WLAN or wifi) technology is a family of protocols for data transmission
based on the IEEE 802.11 specification [37]. The most popular among those standards, i.e,
802.11b/g operate in the 2.4GHz band. At that frequency, the propagating signals are af-
fected by noise and lose strength when encountering physical obstacles, such as walls and
human bodies. The WLAN infrastructure consists of a set of wireless access points (APs)
connected to a cabled LAN. Each AP identifies a cell. As the wifi-enabled mobile device
enters a cell, the device can hear the AP. i.e., receive the beacon frame containing among
the others the ID of the AP (i.e., MAC address).
WPS exploits the knowledge of the wifi infrastructure to estimate the position of the mobile
device. WPS is used in two different settings, for the localization in indoor spaces as in [2]
and for the localization in metropolitan environments, respectively. The Intel’s Place Lab
system [26] falls into this second stream and is the precursor of the hybrid positioning sys-
tems in use today. Place Lab stores in a database (beacon database) the association between
the IDs of the beacons, which can consist not only of wifi AP, but also of cell phone towers,
and fixed Bluetooth devices, and their positions. Clients compute their own location by
hearing one or more IDs, looking up the associated beacons positions in a local database,
and estimating their own position referenced to the beacons positions [26]. Place Lab is
designed to run on the client, i.e., system does not rely on any external structure and pro-
cessing that could reveal user location and that for privacy safeguard[18]. The commercial
solutions, which derive from Place Lab, e.g., Skyhook Wireless7 and Google Location Ser-
vice rely on a central database handled by the third party, i.e., the location provider. Since
every geolocation request is forwarded to the location provider, the location provider is
necessarily aware of the clients locations.
6Skyhook’s wifi positioning system is supposed to determine the position of a mobile device within 20 to 30
meters (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skyhook Wireless)
7http://www.skyhookwireless.com/
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 4 (2011)
Third party geolocation services in LBS 61
3.1.2 Communicating with the location provider
Figure 3 shows the architecture representing the client and the location provider. The in-
teraction between the wifi-enabled client and the location provider is as follows: first the
client scans the WLANs and detects the APs in the vicinity along with the signal strength
for each of them. We refer to this information as context. Thus the context is transmitted
Figure 3: Reference WPS architecture
to the location provider. The location provider estimates the position based on the context
and the beacon database. The position is finally returned to the client.
As an example, Figure 4 reports a fragment of the data transmitted by the client request-
ing the position to the location provider through Google Gears, an early plug-in provid-
ing geolocation capabilities to web browsers 8. In this example, the information which is
transferred to the location provider ( e.g., Google Location Service) includes, besides the IP
address and additional information, the field ”wifi towers” specifying the list of observed
APs, each identified by the six-byte MAC Address, along with the signal strength and an
additional attribute.
{ "version": "1.1.0",
"host": "maps.google.com",
..........................
"wifi_towers": [ {
"mac_address": "01-23-45-67-89-ab",
"signal_strength": 8,
"age": 0},
{ "mac_address": "01-23-45-67-89-ac",
"signal_strength": 4,
"age": 0} ]}
Figure 4: Example of transmitted data
The geolocation service returns the geographical coordinates of the estimated position
along with a measure of accuracy that varies depending on both the positioning technique
and the context information. The context however fluctuates with time, because the signal
is very sensitive to noise and subject to attenuation [23, 38]. Also the position estimated at
a point may vary with time.
8http://code.google.com/apis/gears/geolocation network protocol.html
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Figure 5: Position distribution at a fixed point
As an example, Figure 5 shows the distribution of the positions at a fixed point inside
the University building. In this case the accuracy of the position varies between 20 and 45
meters.
The beacon database is evidently the key resource for this kind of geolocation service.
These databases contain millions of records. Various strategies are currently adopted to
populate the database, e.g.,wardriving, i.e., the scanning of wifi networks while driving and
crowdsourcing in which the database is populated by users. Different techniques are also
used to automatically update the database based on the contextual information sent by the
clients. The quality of the beacon database definitely affects the quality of the geolocation
service.
3.2 Web interface
A simple way to request the geolocation services is through the web. The geo-localization
service can be invoked through a standard programming interface (W3C geolocation API,
[34]), consisting of a set of functions embedded into scripts. This geolocation standard
has found large consensus and all major browsers support it. Moreover, the program-
ming interface is fairly simple, thus embedding geolocation functionalities in web pages is
straightforward. A key feature of this interface is that it is agnostic of the underlying loca-
tion information sources as well as of the geo-locating process, i.e., the way the position is
obtained and by whom is completely transparent to the programmer. Another key aspect
is that the interface is privacy-aware, in that the specification prescribes that the user agent
must, in most cases, get the user’s consent to send the device’s location to a particular web-
site before initiating a process to obtain a cached or new location [12]. Figure 6 shows the
request of consent that is presented to the visitor of the webpage, embedding geolocation
functions, using a geo-enabled browser (in italian). The query specifies that the url, in this
case the url of the University, wants to monitor the physical position of the user. Moreover,
the user is explicitly asked to grant or deny the consent.
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Figure 6: The request of user’s consent
4 Privacy-aware geolocation: research issues
The development of a comprehensive and coherent framework which minimizes the inter-
action of the client with the location provider requires investigation of novel approaches
and specialized tools. To put these research issues into the right perspective, it is necessary
to make assumptions about the work-flow of the privacy-aware geolocation process.
Work-flow. The client maintains a set of positions that have been visited in a local mem-
ory, the cache (Figure 7). The positions represented in the cache are those which are to be
protected. Positions can also represent regions of space. Each position is recorded along
with an environmental fingerprint (simply fingerprint) and a representative point. The
representative point is acquired from the location provider. Note that this position is com-
municated to the location provider only the first time the position is visited. To estimate the
current position, the client gets in input the fingerprint of the current position and matches
it against the fingerprints in the cache. If the matching is successful, then the represen-
tative point of the position in the cache is returned; otherwise, the geolocation request is
forwarded to the location provider. The output of the geolocation process is thus a point
(x,y) that can be either determined locally or obtained from the location provider.
Figure 7: Privacy-aware geolocation workflow
The geolocation service is privacy-aware because it avoids the communication of repeated
visits to the same position. Note that the frequency with which a position is visited can re-
veal a lot about an individual. For example, detecting that an individual is at the hospital at
a certain time is an information which may be not sufficient to infer that the user has health
concerns. Evidently if any position in a time interval falls in the hospital, the information
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has a different value.
Research issues. Defining a privacy-preserving framework which supports the above
workflow raises several issues:
(1) To define a model of the protected positions. Different criteria can be adopted for
selecting the positions to keep in the cache. For example, a trivial criteria is to keep
only the most recent positions. The drawback of this approach is that users do not
have any form of control. A more appropriate solution is the let the user select the
positions to protect based on personal preferences. We refer to these positions as
private positions. The model of private position is the user-oriented model which defines
the meaning of private positions.
(2) To define a model for the representation of the private positions in the cache and
their recognition. Each private position should be associated with an environmental
fingerprint. The privacy-aware geolocation model defines the fingerprint model as well
as the computation model for the recognition of the private positions in the cache.
(3) Tomeasure the effectiveness of privacy-aware geolocation. Privacymetrics are needed
to evaluate the effectiveness of the protection. Those metrics should also allow the
users to tune their privacy preferences.
(4) Users can establish different relationships of trust with third parties (i.e., LBS provider
and location provider). We distinguish two cases:
(i) The user does not trust the location provider but trusts the LBS provider. More-
over the two parties are known not to collude. Note that this case is not so un-
usual as could appear at first sight. For example, a user might want to share the
position with the website of the cycling club the user belongs to without letting
the location provider know that he/she is at home.
(ii) Parties are both untrusted. For example, the user wants to share the position
with the members of a popular geo-social network without letting the parties
know his/her the exact position. The two parties may represent related or even
the same organization. The requirement is to extend the protection to LBS providers
by integrating existing PETs. We refer to this problem as PETs interoperability.
Figure 8 illustrates the dependencies among the above models. Each model is represented
by a rectangle. The direction of the arrow has the meaning depends-from. The model of
the private position is the basic building blocks. Privacy metrics are defined based on the
position model. The privacy-aware geolocation model depends on both the position model
and the privacy metrics. Finally, PETs interoperability involves all the components.
5 Research directions
We now discuss in more detail the research issues. For each of the previous models, we
outline some of the requirements, current state-of-the-art approaches and their limitations,
and a possible approach.
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Figure 8: Dependencies among models
5.1 The model of private positions
Requirements. The privacy-preserving framework should not only provide a compre-
hensive protection of privacy against untrusted providers, but also be usable. The lack of
privacy usability is one of the factors that hinder the adoption of PETs. “ Usability relates
not only to understanding what taking a particular action means in the context of a par-
ticular interaction, but also to whether the user understands the implications of his or her
choices in a broader context ” [30]. Defining which positions the user can protect through
high level concepts andmetaphors can improve system usability of the system and enhance
user experience.
Current approaches and limitations. The usability aspects of privacy have been exten-
sively investigated within the human-computer interaction community (HCI). Research in
HCI investigates, among the others, how people perceive privacy threats and ”how well
a given system facilitates (or inhibits) desired privacy practices” [19]. Research, however,
mainly focuses on the usability of privacy polices. The usability of PETs in the LBS realm
is an open issue [19]. A PET which is brought as example of poor usability is location
k-anonymity in LBS [35]. In fact, although users can personalize the level of privacy by
choosing the value of k, it is difficult to figure out which value is most appropriate in a
given context.
The position model, commonly adopted by PETs, is generally very basic: the implicit
assumption is that the private position is a point in the target space. Moreover any point
is potentially private, in that users cannot express preferences on the positions to protect.
A different viewpoint is presented in [9]. Positions are naturally aggregated in places, and
places may require different levels of protection depending on the privacy requirements.
The notion of place is a powerful modeling spatial concept which is increasingly used in a
variety of contexts. A place is defined in the area of pervasive computing as ”an important
locale where the user spends a substantial amount of time and/or visits frequently” [24]. In
environmental psychology, sense of place is used to mean the”meaning attached to a spatial
setting by a person or group” [21]. The notion of places also supports a variety of appli-
cations, including personalized mobile searches based on place preference, the analysis of
human spatial and temporal behavior [24] as well as spatio-temporal data modeling [29].
Finally, the notion of place is relevant in a variety of commercial applications. For example,
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the users of Facebook Place can tag their current position with the name of the place to let
their friends know they are or have been in that place. Yet, the full potential of the concept
of place in location privacy has not been fully explored.
Approach. The approach is to specialize the concept of place to that of private place.
A private place conceptualizes the intuition that there are some regions of space that be-
long to the personal sphere. Users’ positions inside private places should not be disclosed
to untrusted parties. Relevant features of the place model are:
• A private place is a place that the user frequents. Whether a place is private or not
depends exclusively on the individual’s perception and not on physical constraints.
Thus a place can be indoor or outdoor. Private places can be tagged with a name,
yet those names are not part of any shared geographical ontology, i.e., they can be
arbitrarily defined by users. While home is perhaps the most popular example of
private space, we can imagine private places like: my boyfriend’s home, my department.
• A private place denotes a space which may not have well-defined boundaries. It
is often the case that users are not aware of the geographical extent of a place. For
example, an user may have a very approximate idea of the spatial extent of a hospital,
yet the hospital can be perceived as private. Of course, users could locate themselves
over maps and then identify the private places of concern, i.e., the hospital. This is
also the approach in [9]. Yet, a private place may not have any direct relationship
with generally recognized places. Moreover, places on maps are generally identified
by points, and thus do not have clear boundaries. Further, the operation can be costly
for the user.
A private place thus should reflect the (possibly partial) knowledge that the user has
of a certain region of space. A private place can thus be created out of some basic
information, for example a single position inside a place, and later the knowledge of
that place can expand through a learning process.
The concept of private place is useful also for two other reasons: it naturally supports
privacy personalization. Users can choose the private places based on the individual pref-
erences and in this way tune the degree of privacy. Moreover it provides a rationale for the
limited protection achievable through the privacy-aware geolocation (i.e., not all positions
can be protected).
5.2 Privacy metrics
Requirements. Privacy metrics quantify the extent of privacy problems and the effective-
ness of protection. Privacy measures can be also useful to increase the user’s awareness
on the level of privacy. The application context under consideration is however peculiar.
Therefore privacy metrics should be properly tailored.
Current approaches and limitations. In the area of privacy-preserving data publishing,
the effectiveness of PETs, in particular of anonymization methods, is measured in terms of
privacy loss and utility loss, where: the privacy loss is quantified by the adversary’s knowl-
edge gain about the sensitive values on an individual; the utility loss by the information
loss about sensitive values of large populations [27]. The fundamental problem is thus to
balance the individual interest, i.e., privacy, against the collective interest, i.e., utility. Those
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metrics still make sense when the privacy can be personalized, as for example in LBS. In
that case the idea of collective interest should be replaced by the notion of individual ben-
efit. e.g., the quality of the service. For example in [9], the protection mechanism discloses
coarse locations in place of exact positions. The privacy loss is quantified by the probability
that the user in a coarse region, is inside a sensitive place. Instead the utility is measured
in terms of positional accuracy.
Privacy metrics originated in data publishing and then translated into the LBS area, how-
ever, cannot be directly transposed into the scenario under consideration. The main reason
is that, in our case, the privacy-preserving strategy is significantly different: the strategy
is not to degrade the quality of the sensitive information, i.e., the location, but simply not
to disclose it. It is difficult to say therefore what ”degree of privacy” means in this case.
Suitable privacy metrics are required.
Approach. The approach is to re-define the notion of privacy and utility. The idea is
to consider defining private places as the maximal form of protection achievable in this
context. Ideally the amount of protection depends only on the number of private places.
In practice the geolocation methods, for the inherent complexity of the problem, are not
able to ensure maximum protection. The privacy and utility measures thus express the
deviation from the optimal protection. We say that the protection is optimal when both these
conditions are verified:
(i) No position falling inside private places is communicated to the location provider. We
call false negatives the private positions which are disclosed to the location provider.
(ii) The only positions which are not requested from the location provider are those
which are inside private places. We call false positives, the positions which are er-
roneously considered private.
In other words, the protection is optimal when the protection mechanism does not devi-
ate from the expected behavior. False positives determine positional inaccuracy, because
the exact position is approximated by the representative position of a private place. False
negatives determine a loss of privacy because private positions are disclosed to the location
provider. A simple approach is to take the number of false positives as measure of utility
loss; and the number of false negatives as measure of privacy loss.
5.3 Privacy-aware geolocation model
Requirements. Privacy-aware geolocation assumes that private positions can be associ-
ated with environmental fingerprints and that those fingerprints can be recognized in real
time. Although one can envisage using different kinds of environmental conditions, a
reasonable choice is to exploit the wifi infrastructure. Accordingly each private position
should be associated with a set of wifi APs.
This is similar to what a WPS does. Yet there is a substantial difference in that in our case
the position is estimated by the client and the client is not aware of the physical position of
the wifi APs. In other words, clients cannot rely on a beacon database (see Section 3.1.1). At
most, clients can detect the wifi context andmatch it against possible patterns. The ultimate
requirement is that the client should be able to recognize private positions based on limited
knowledge of the wifi infrastructure. Another requirement is that these techniques should
try to minimize privacy and utility loss, in accordance with the selected privacy metrics.
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Current approaches and limitations. Approaches which address some of the above re-
quirements are developed within the recent place discovery research stream. Place discovery
methods attempt to find places that are important to an individual user [24]. These tech-
niques comprise two main classes of solutions, called geometry-based and fingerprint-based
methods, respectively [24]. Of these, the latter class of methods are definitely significant
for our problem.
• Geometry-based methods are applied to historical positions (e.g., temporal ordered
sequences of GPS readings) to find places where the individual stays for significant
periods of time. Approaches are generally based on clustering as in[39], and statistical
techniques, as in [36]. These methods are used off-line to discover places that are not
known in advance. This case does not match our scenario.
• Location fingerprinting associates location dependent characteristics of radio signals
(the fingerprint) with a location and uses these characteristics to infer the location
[23]. Commonly, fingerprint-based techniques are used for localization purposes,
e.g., WPS. Place discovery is different from fingerprint-based localization, not only
because of the different granularity of the location information, but also for the objec-
tives. An example of place discovery problem [24] is to recognize that an individual
enters and exits from a place which is not known in advance and in which the user
has spent significant amount of time. Another type of problem is place learning. The
problem is to build in real time and interactively [1, 17] the wifi-based fingerprints
of places. For example the approach in [1] uses a learning algorithm to identify a
representative set of APs for a place (called semantically meaningful area).
To our knowledge, place discovery techniques have not been used for privacy-preserving
purposes.
Approach. The design of the privacy-aware geolocation process can rely on two kinds of
methods: i) place learningmethods to interactively create wifi-based fingerprints of private
places: architectural terms, the effect of this operation is to insert a private place into the
cache. ii) Place learning (or place classification) methods to possibly assign a place label to
the current position of the client (i.e., its wifi context).
Since the results of these operation may be not always correct, the geolocation operation
should return privacy measures, i.e. false positives and false negatives. These measures
can then be used to improve the learning process.
5.4 PETs interoperability
Requirements. The problem is to provide a comprehensive framework which not only
protects the position from the location provider, but also from untrusted LBS providers. As
an example, consider the case of an individual sharing his/her position with the members
of a geo-social network. The user does not want to reveal his/her exact position whenever
such position is inside a sensitive place, say hospital. Although the user activates the pro-
tection against the location provider and creates, for example, the private place ”hospital”,
the representative position of ”hospital” is disclosed to the LBS provider every time the
service is accessed from that place.
Existing PETs provide various forms of protection against LBS providers. Commonly
these techniques map exact positions onto locations providing privacy guarantees. The
integration of an existing PET into our framework is seemingly straightforward, because
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the PET can simply refer to the privacy-aware geolocation process as location source. This
approach, however, presents important limitations. For example, whenever different pri-
vacy metrics are used, it is not clear how to measure the effectiveness of the protection as a
whole. All this calls for criteria and methods addressing the issue of PETs interoperability.
Current approaches and limitations. We introduce PETs interoperability issues through
a few examples. A popular privacy-preserving strategy is to replace the actual position
with a coarse location before the location information is transmitted to the LBS provider.
The coarse location can be generated in various ways, for example by a trusted third party,
which knows the position of individuals and can generate k-anonymous regions. The prob-
lem of integrating k-anonymity based PETs is twofold: these techniques require a trusted
third party while in our framework the only third party aware of the position of users is the
location provider which is untrusted; the k-anonymous region may be contained in some
place that the user wants to hide, i.e., the hospital. The degree of personalization is thus
limited, i.e., the users cannot select the places to protect. In the ultimate analysis, there
is a significant mismatch between the two models of private positions and that seems to
preclude an effective integration.
The personalization of the private positions is possible in PROBE [9]. The private positions
are places and user can select the places to protect. Even in this case the integration is
not straightforward because the two notions of place are different: in PROBE the places
are geometric entities with precise boundaries, while in our scenario the places do not
have a geometric characterization, i.e., places are represented through radio signal-based
fingerprints. The problem is thus how to reconcile the two views in a coherent framework.
Approach. An approach is to experiment with the integration with an existing model to
hopefully come up with a more general methodology. The existing model in this case is
PROBE. To overcome the position models mismatch, two alternative approaches can be
devised: the first approach is to force the user to create places with a geometric extent,
for example through the use of maps. In this way the private position model is unique in
the system. At run-time, the position returned by the privacy-aware geolocation process
is matched against the coarse regions generated off-line by PROBE to cover the private
places. If the position falls into one of these regions, such region is transmitted to the LBS
provider in place of the exact position. The drawback of this solution is that it requires the
user’s manual intervention.
The alternative approach is to represent the geometry of private places in approximated
manner. For example, the boundaries of private places can be automatically generated
from their representative points, e.g. as a circle. The drawback is that the lack of geomet-
ric accuracy makes it difficult to measure the degree of privacy and utility of the whole
solution.
6 Future plans and conclusion
Protecting privacy in LBS is an evolving research area. Web-based LBS will become in-
creasingly popular in the near future, following the diffusion of geolocation standards, the
advances in wifi-based geo-localization and novel business models. Those services offer in-
credible opportunities to third parties to collect a huge amount of position data in a simple
way. Protecting individuals’ positions in web-based LBS is thus important. The develop-
ment of a comprehensive privacy preserving framework poses several technical challenges
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because the position information can be provided by an untrusted third party. In this pa-
per, we have outlined major technical issues, and suggested possible directions of research
toward the deployment of the concept of privacy-aware geolocation.
We conclude suggesting some priorities and directions for the future: the first direction
concerns the development and experiment with fingerprint-based place learning methods
to support privacy-aware geolocation. A second line of activities concerns the engineering
aspects, i.e., integrating the system into existing open sources geo-enabled web browsers.
The third line of activity aims at extending the framework through the integration of exist-
ing PETs. Finally, experimenting with the users of web-based LBSs is definitely important
to validate the effective usability of the solution.
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